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Abstract 
COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE 1990s:
A FRAMEWORK FOR 
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
Marilyn R. Rogers
Costs of terrorism are high. Beyond the 
immediate targets of violence, there exists an audience 
of public perception whose fragile temperament is too 
often swayed by the seeming randomness of the act. 
Resultant feelings of fear which are generated, en 
masse, serve the "agenda of terror" that the terrorist 
uses to further his cause. While the terrorist gains 
momentum, legitimate governments lose ground when public 
confidence in state protection is shattered. To minimize 
such effects, governments must consider a variety of 
options to counter the impact of terrorism.
Chapter one focuses on the necessity of 
counterterrorism plans which encompass the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding terrorist activities. The 
philosophy of viable deterrence is set forth as the 
fundamental precept of all counterterrorist options.
Chapter two examines the historical evolution of 
terrorist activity from a tactical open warfare 
alternative to its modern form as a complicated
cooperative political tool designed to gain and control 
power.
Chapter three develops the variables important to 
to categorization of terrorist groups. The 
comprehensive typology facilitates analytical 
identification of vulnerabilities with which to exploit 
terrorist organizations via tailored countermeasure 
"packages."
Chapters four through seven contain descriptions 
of countermeasures generally available to policymakers 
facing the problem of terrorism. Case examples are 
included to illustrate conditions under which such 
measures as legal initiatives, economic sanctions and 
various force options have failed or been successful.
Chapter eight contains a multi-dimensional 
counterterrorism model designed to simultaneously 
consider probable effects of optimal
countermeasures— within changing contexts. This dynamic 
model focuses on three principal areas which should be 
considered in countermeasure packaging: the specific
countermeasure, the terrorist group and the political 
environment. Policymakers are provided with a range of 
countermeasures which can be applied in a wide variety 
of situations.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Terrorism is a phenomenon which has plagued 
civilized societies throughout recorded history. Not 
bound by moral conventions, the terrorist seeks to 
manipulate and maneuver others into a debilitating state 
of fear. It is not the toll of lives which makes 
terrorism repugnant, for those deaths have been 
relatively minor when compared to the consequences of 
conventional homicide or even automobile accidents. 
Rather, the danger inherent in terroristic violence is 
that it penetrates the very core of our values and 
belief systems, threatening the order necessary to 
maintain a peaceful existence.
As isolated incidents, terrorist attacks are of 
minor significance in the global arena. But, like 
dozens of small fires smoldering in the forest, they are 
capable at any time of dramatic resurgence, prompting 
chaotic reaction. Nevertheless, whereas it may be 
difficult to obliterate the fires, measures can be taken 
to diminish the effects and protect society from 
large-scale destruction.
Because terrorism is an international phenomenon 
that cuts across both geographic and cultural 
boundaries, it is necessary to formulate a strategy 
which allows responsiveness in a wide variety of 
situations. Decision-makers must be able to understand 
motives of the actors involved, the actual deeds, 
probable political repercussions of the acts and the 
state risks involved in mounting responses. 
Nevertheless, action in virtually every case is 
necessary to bolster governmental legitimacy— even if 
responses are primarily symbolic. If terrorists are 
allowed to violate with impunity the established laws 
and practices of sovereign governments, the danger then 
exists that respect for the authority of the state may 
diminish from within.
Statement of the Problem
A pragmatic approach to the problem of terrorist 
violence is needed. Efforts by the U.S. in the past to 
counter terrorism reveal a general focus on an 
hierarchical method of assigning countermeasures. What 
is needed is an appropriate countermeasure "package" 
that coincides with the particular terrorist threat. 
This package can be flexible enough to consider the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist
activity. It may not always be optimal to decide 
between sanctions, but rather to assign a variety of 
measures aimed at deterring the terrorist activity of a 
particular group or state.
Essential in determining the appropriate 
countermeasure to assign to each incidence of terrorism 
is an analysis of the vulnerabilities of subversive 
groups. To do this, an all-encompassing typology of 
terrorist groups must be established. The first part of 
this thesis depicts such a classification scheme that is 
responsive to the dynamic nature of terrorism. Although 
basic terrorist activity is not a new occurrence, it has 
nonetheless evolved into a more complicated, often 
cooperative venture. The typology developed herein will 
provide immediate access to the potential 
vulnerabilities of groups identified as responsible for 
terrorist activities. Much of the information contained 
in the classification scheme is assuredly known to 
government analysts who currently study terrorist groups 
and some data necessary to respond to terrorist acts may 
exist in various information bases. In those cases where 
perpetrators of threats/violence are unknown, evidence 
must be gathered in an effort to further build data 
bases. Subsequent to the identification of terrorist 
groups, the typology can be utilized to reveal
locations/ strengths and weaknesses of the terrorists.
The legal system and the model can, at that point, be 
utilized to establish which available responses are most 
appropriate for that group at that point in time.
The remainder of the thesis outlines various common 
responses to terrorist activity. Possibilities range 
from economic and diplomatic sanctions to covert and 
even overt military action. The response should be 
measured, depending upon the contextual circumstances of 
the terrorist act, the group believed to be responsible 
and the overall existing world political situation.
While decision-makers ideally have well-developed 
contingency plans in the event of an attack, they are 
generally limited to sequential responses which do not 
take a realistic view of the dynamic environment in 
which terrorism takes place.
The developed model will be geared to terrorist 
activity that impacts upon U.S. personnel and interests 
on an international scale.
Assumptions
This thesis is based on the following basic 
assumptions:
1. Terrorism will not be eradicated, but it can be 
minimized and controlled by application of optimum 
countermeasures.
2. Terrorist acts are, within given contexts, rational, 
understandable and predictable.
3. Notwithstanding support for specific or isolated 
terrorist acts, virtually all sovereign governments 
conceptually oppose terrorism because of the potential 
for social destabilization.
4. The U.S. Government lacks a comprehensive, 
integrated counterterrorist doctrine with which to 
effectively control terrorism and minimize its effects.
5. To be effective, each terrorist countermeasure must 
enjoy widespread popular support, even if 
retrospectively.
6. The damage potential of terrorist acts will continue 
to increase in severity due primarily to assimilation of 
destructive technologies.
Definitional Limitations
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As so often occurs with terms that become 
routinized with overuse, the concept of terrorism, while 
widely understood, seems to evade a universally-accepted 
definition. As Dr. James Motley so succinctly explains, 
"Terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe 
than to define.
Walter Laqueur blames the media, government and 
academia for misunderstanding terrorism. He says that 
it is too readily used as a substitute for rebellion, 
street battle, insurrection and guerrilla warfare which 
so often leads to inflation of statistical data.
Alex Schmid attempts to solve the problem of defining 
terrorism by listing its common denominators. In over 
100 definitions by well-known authors in the field, 
twenty-two elements emerged as ingredients of terrorism. 
Among those, violence, force, politics, fear and terror 
were seen as the primary "attributes" of terrorism. 
Still, lengthy definitions, attempted by the State 
Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
scholars, have met with little universal acceptance. 
Despite the lack of consensus, terrorism today generally 
describes the destructive acts of disenfranchised people 
which are designed to gain attention or in some other 
way further political causes.
Distinctions should be made, however, between 
ordinary crime, political terrorism and the situation 
wherein a group, government or military force uses 
terrorist tactics for internal security and control. 
Murder, bombings, robbery and other violent acts can be 
both criminalistic and terroristic in nature. But it is 
the political motivation of perpetrators which garners 
the label of terrorism to certain acts. The U.S. State 
Department defines terrorism as, "Premediated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience."^
In sum, today's "terrorist" is generally defined 
as a suppressed or non-controlling party whose aim is to 
gain attention through fear and who seeks political 
power through the "ultimate realization" of the 
righteousness of his cause.
But to have arrived at this central concept of 
what terrorism is and, more importantly, is not, 
requires an inherent value judgement. Arnold considers 
the definition problem of terrorism merely a distinction 
between means and ends.® For example, the Italian 
judge in the Achille Lauro hijacking case stated that 
the terrorist had "a just cause, flawed by bad means."
8
Martha Crenshaw agrees with Arnold in that some 
terrorists enjoy widespread "legitimacy" depending on 
the ends they serve. She believes a "neutral" 
definition of terrorism is needed so that the use of it
. 7can be judged either legitimate or illegitimate.
Chomsky also views the western world as having molded 
the definition of terrorism upon our own ideology to 
ensure the good guys are not terrorists and bad ones 
are.8
Laqueur notes that,
. . .disputes about a comprehensive, detailed 
definition of terrorism will continue for a 
long time, that they will not result in a 
consensus, and that they will make no notable 
contribution towards the understanding 
of terrorism.
Knowledge with respect to definitional 
constraints will do little to solve the seemingly 
unrelenting problem of terrorism. A consensus would, 
however, provide a basis of agreement from which to 
study terrorist groups and potential countermeasures.
The purpose of this study is not to determine an 
appropriate definition of terrorism. It is a complex 
problem which evades simple solutions. Most scholarly 
definitions incorporate the ingredients Schmid collected 
from experts in the field of political violence and 
terrorism.10 The media, the public, scholars, 
government officials and policy-makers may not have
9
achieved a precise, shared meaning of "terrorism" but 
ultimately they all understand it as anti-social 
activity which is unacceptable in the international 
arena.
Theoretical Constructs
"The interest of the USA in preventing terrorism 
in the future can only be served by resisting it 
in the present.1,1 1
Assuming the identity of a potential terrorist can 
ultimately be uncovered, the next step entails deciding 
which counterterrorist option is most likely to prevent 
future acts. There are two basic options for a 
government faced with the threat of political violence: 
defense and deterrence.
Defense involves forcefully preventing an enemy 
from attacking by means of preemption and prevention.
It requires extensive preparation and an accurate 
intelligence network advising on specific potential 
terrorist plans. Levy and Rodriguez examine the 
success realized by employment of defensive measures 
designed to counter specific forms of terrorism. They 
point out that in the early 1970s, airplane hijackings 
increased at an alarming rate in both the U.S. and in 
Western Europe. The resultant use of sky marshalls and 
eventually pre-flight passenger screening met with
10
considerable success in stemming the skyjackings.1^
Bombings of embassies and automobiles by terrorists
further led to the implementation of additional physical
measures where vulnerabilities existed. Even the best
defensive measures, however, can ultimately be defeated
by a terrorist group through the differential selection
of targets. Jenkins believes that the greatest
advantage terrorists have is their virtually unlimited
1 ?range of targets. J If one target is well protected, 
terrorists are able to concentrate on "soft" targets 
that are not as well protected. While defense is a 
necessary aspect of a counterterrorism plan, it seems 
inherently a reactive strategy largely determined by the 
activity of the terrorist.
Policy development, moreover, relies on the 
principle of deterrence— a cost-benefit differential. 
Morgan defines deterrence in its simplest terms as "the 
use of threats of harm to prevent someone from doing 
something you do not want him to do."14
Explaining this theory, Wilson examines various 
aspects of state power and citizen acquiescence of 
individual rights. He observes that philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes believed that man is a calculating being, one who 
needs control to protect himself from conflicts of
1 C tdesires. Hobbesian philosophy holds that it is the 
government's responsibility, therefore, to protect
11
citizens both from each other and from foreign threats. 
In exchange, men cede their rights to the government,
because the result is a net advantage for them to do so.
Beccaria, the 18th Century Italian criminologist, 
elaborated on Hobbes' premise by asserting that men are 
rationally self-interested and normally will not violate 
society's norms when the perceived costs outweigh the 
benefits. Notwithstanding that this "classical" school 
of thought is disputed by some observers of human 
nature, it forms the fundamental basis of our system of 
punishment for crimes. The theory of deterrence also 
applies to countering terrorist activity. While it is 
recognized that punishment may not deter a 
religiously-inspired zealot hoping to die for his cause,
it can have an impact on the state or religious
organization which is motivating him to commit acts of 
violence.
The theory of deterrence aims to prevent conflict 
by convincing the adversary that the cost of the 
contemplated action far outweighs any potential gain.
In the U.S. it is the government's goal to influence 
terrorists' decisions by threatening, in a believable 
manner, that "unacceptable damage" will be the direct 
result of a terrorist act. The purpose of a strategy of
12
deterrence is to affect the perceptions of a terrorist 
group so that the value-maximizing opponent will react 
to an effectively communicated and credible warning by 
desisting from planned acts.
The use of a deterrence theory to minimize 
terrorist activity implies that the terrorists are 
rational. Evidence collected by Jenkins, Johnson and 
Ronfeld indicates a high percentage of success by 
terrorists in achieving specific g o a l s . S a n d l e r ,  
Tschirhart and Cauley find this "success rate" evidence 
of rationality. "One must remember," they note, "that 
an actor's goals do not determine rationality; rather,
it is an actor's pursuit of these goals in the face of
. 1 7constraints. . . Stohl also rejects the
misconception of terrorists as madmen and encourages
that policymakers recognize the fact that terrorists are
"serious political actor(s). He believes this
realization will aid in the formulation of more
effective counterterrorist policy.
Crenshaw envisions U.S. policy utilizing two forms 
of deterrence. The first type of deterrence she labels 
"denial," which closely resembles a policy of defense. 
The government's intent is to deny "gain" to the 
adversary, thereby raising the cost of any action the 
terrorist takes. The second type of deterrence is
13
"punishment" or "retribution." This represents ad hoc 
responses to terrorist acts. Punishment can either be a 
measured response intended to "fit" the initial 
terrorist act or it can be an escalation designed to 
show resolve in the fight against terrorism in general. 
Military force, either covert or overt, is often cited 
as a viable punishment/retaliation response intended to
1 Qdeter future acts. 3
Crenshaw also identifies several problems with a 
governmental polity of deterrence. Perhaps the most 
obvious problem that has faced U.S. policymakers is the 
fundamental difference in values between western and 
middle eastern peoples. This difference can provoke 
escalation when actions are misperceived and when 
opposing forces are willing to take what seems to be
onnon-cost-effective action. u In a similar vein,
Morgan finds the major complication in counterterrorism
to lie in determining the proper means for implementing 
91deterrence. Jervis faults the process of
communication necessary to relay threats to adversaries.
Accordingly, he sees the potential for disaster when:
Signals that seem clear to the sender are 
missed or misinterpreted by the receiver; 
actions meant to convey one impression often 
leave quite a different one; attempts to 
deter often enrage, attempts to show calm 
strength may appear as weakness.
Thus, deterrence theory demands that policymakers
have accurate views of the other side— the terrorists'
world view as well as their own views of the situation.
As Jervis explains, these images "influence the other's
behavior in general and its reaction to the state in
particular. . .a first step is to grasp the other side's
. 9^values, beliefs and perceptions."
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Chapter II 
The Evolution of Terrorist Activity
In order to implement a counterterrorist plan, it
is important first to understand how the nature of 
terrorism has changed over the centuries. What began as 
an alternate tactic to open warfare has over time 
evolved into a complicated cooperative venture. Each 
incidence of terrorism, as it is illustrated throughout 
history, has left its mark on modern-day terrorists.
With an historical perspective, terrorist activity can 
be appreciated in light of the changing nature of our 
society and the lessons of history can provide insights 
into the present and future course of terrorism.
Pre-20th Century Terrorism
Laqueur writes of a terrorist group prominent in 
the 11th century known as the Assassins. The group was
based in Persia and, through successful operations,
spread to Syria, killing governors, caliphs, religious 
and political leaders on their way. Their first leader, 
Hassan Sibai, realized that as a group the Assassins 
were too small to compete successfully in open warfare. 
Therefore, Sibai directed his followers to carry out,
18
what Laqueur describes as, "a planned, systematic, 
long-term campaign of terror."* An important element 
in the success of the Assassins was their need to 
operate in secrecy, disguised as strangers or even 
Christians so they could get close to their victims.
This closeness was essential because the Assassins 
always used daggers to kill their victims, symbolic of 
the fact that to them murder was a sacramental act.
Some would call the Assassins "fanatics" intent on 
defending the autonomy of their religious sect. Robin 
Wright points out that the Assassins were also fearless 
warriors who "courted death and martyrdom." Wright 
suggests that Sibai was able to convince his followers 
of the "delights of heaven" by administering hashish to 
the soldiers before battle.^ They were told that the 
euphoria experienced was a foretaste of death and 
eternal life in heaven and that dying while in battle 
would assure them a like reward. Much the same 
message is perpetuated today in Iran by the teachings of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors. The 
Assassins, however, were eventually defeated in the 13th 
Century by perhaps an even more ruthless band of 
terrorists led by Genghis Khan.
The legend of Genghis Khan has survived as an 
early example of the success of a terror strategy. Khan
and his Mongolian horde created a mystique of carnage
and destruction as they swept through 13th Century Asia.
The Mongols discovered a psychological phenomenon often
observed in nature: the debilitating effects of fear.
They found that humans, in spite of (or perhaps because
of) their superior ability to reason, were, nonetheless,
susceptible to confusion, disorientation and paralysis
induced by terrifying situations. By carefully staging
what appeared to be random acts of ruthless killing and
destruction, the Mongols were able to overrun heavily
populated territories with little resistance. These
terror tactics, born within the context of traditional
warfare, highlight the value of publicity in terrorist 
4situations.
Within a different context— that of domestic 
social control— "terrorism" entered the modern lexicon 
during the aftermath of the French Revolution. As with 
Genghis Khan and his Mongols, Robespierre and the 
revolutionaries needed a tactic to subdue superior 
numbers. The "reign of terror," although excessive and 
eventually counter-productive, served to intimidate 
opponents through fear and uncertainty. Similarly, the 
20th Century Russian Bolsheviks found terrorist tactics 
to be useful— perhaps essential— in subduing potential 
domestic opposition to their tenuous control of government.
A contemporary practitioner of terrorism has much 
to learn from these predecessors. The Assassins proved 
that a smaller, less capable group of opponents could 
project power by operating in secrecy. Their 
fearlessness was enhanced by instilling a spiritual 
aspect which helped to convince followers of the 
righteousness of their cause. The value of publicity 
designed to intimidate adversaries was exemplified by 
Genghis Khan and the leaders of the French Revolution. 
Likewise, the Bolsheviks demonstrated the value of 
institutionalizing fear in the population to control 
domestic opposition. Some or all of these 
elements— secrecy, fanatic religious obsession, a need 
for publicity, as well as fear and intimidation— are 
practiced in various forms by terrorists today. Where 
the dagger may have been replaced by the suicidal truck 
driver, the effect on the general population is still 
the same: terror and frustration.
Modern-Day Terrorism
Terrorism in the latter half of the 20th Century 
is all of the above and more. Certainly it depends upon 
the same psychological principles intuitively recognized 
by the Assassins, successfully utilized by the Mongols 
and subsequently practiced by revolutionaries who needed
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drastic measures to maintain precariously-held political 
power. But modern-day terrorism has evolved into a 
complicated reflection of our complex society whose 
history is as diverse as the type of terror practiced by 
the various groups.
Terrorism in the first half of the 20th Century 
was mainly used in nationalist-separatist movements by 
right-wing political groups. Two primary centers of 
activity were Macedonia and Palestine. Macedonia, 
located in southeast Europe, is a "meeting place" of 
nations, a fact which surely contributed to its complex 
and turbulent history. Settled in the 6th Century by 
Slavs, Macedonia was successively dominated by the 
Byzantines (9th Century), the Serbians (14th Century) 
and eventually the Ottoman Turks (14-19th Centuries).
In the 1800's, nationalist revivals in the Balkans 
reignited, heightened by the Ottoman policy of playing 
one group against another. A secret terrorist 
organization sprang up at this time which worked for 
Macedonian independence and which was supported by 
Bulgaria. The end of World War I saw a continuation of 
state-sponsored terrorism, directed, according to 
Durant, largely from Bulgaria. The Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization practiced terrorism in 
Yugoslavia with some success inasmuch as Macedonia was 
then a constituent republic within Yugoslavia.
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Palestinian nationalists turned to terrorist 
tactics after the British announced a complete 
withdrawal of troops by August of 1948. Other Arab 
countries, in support of the Palestinians, voiced strong 
protest. Gabbay reports that, as early as December 
1947, the Arab Premiers met in Cairo and secretly agreed 
"to arm Palestine Arabs, reinforce them with volunteers 
and collect funds to finance an all-out fight in 
Palestine.
This Cairo Declaration, however, was by no means 
the first incidence of terrorism in Palestine. As early 
as the 1920's, Arabs opposed to Jewish occupation 
attacked settlements in Tel-Chai, a northern Zionist 
settlement in Jerusalem and in Hebron. Arab terror met 
with Jewish counterterror led by the famous Zionist, 
Vladimir Jabotinsky. Once the 1948 Arab-Israeli war 
began, small Jewish terrorist organizations had begun a 
strategy of terror operations designed to liquidate Arab 
opposition. Shipler reports that the Irgun, a terrorist 
organization headed by Menachem Begin, attacked an Arab 
village on April 9, 1948, and killed 250 inhabitants. 
News of the killing of innocent civilians was widespread 
and Begin allegedly reported that the propaganda value 
of the deed was, "worth half a dozen battalions to the
Dforces of Israel."
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In the decolonization process after World War II, 
terrorism was widespread in such countries as Cyprus, 
Aden and Algeria. Although these victims of terror were 
often innocents, they remained largely confined to the 
terrorist's homeland and reflected the goals of the 
terrorist activity.
Inter-Group Cooperation
During the last fifteen years the nature of
geopolitics has changed such that purely national
interests have become less important as a concern of the
terrorist. Cooperation between different terrorist
groups has provided the aggressor with a vastly expanded
logistical and tactical potential. As Laqueur relates:
Multinational terrorism reached a first climax 
in the early 1970s. . .a new species of terrorism 
emerged, an almost impenetrable maze of linkages, 
intrigues, common and conflicting interests, 
including open and covert collaboration with 
foreign governments who preferred to stay in 
the shadows.9
One reason for the internationalization of 
terrorism is the changing nature of our global society. 
Jenkins cites the jet, coupled with vast improvements in 
news coverage in all parts of the globe, as a major 
reason for increased interest in foreign activities.
A primary reason for the increased emphasis on 
terrorism in the Middle East is the failure of the Arabs 
to achieve success in their quest for victory over
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Israel. The Palestinians have been forced to turn to
more pragmatic tactics following repeated diplomatic and
military failures. Goren describes many cooperative
terrorist ventures initiated by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO). Examples are:
the Air France hijacking to Entebbe in 1976 
which was carried out by both German Red 
Army Faction (RAF) members and the PLO; the 
hijacking of the Lufthansa Airliner to 
Mogadishu in October, 1977, which was 
carried out by the PLO and organized by 
Wadi Haddad, who was at that time in
East Germany, as a service to the RAF of
West Germany. 1
A Rand Study in 1985 reveals the "growing links
and cooperation among international terrorist groups,
• • . “17especially m  terms of shared intelligence. They
consider this trend to be significant because of the
extension of available resources and added flexibility 
cooperation provides.
While cooperation among terrorist groups is a 
relatively new phenomenon, its actual roots are 
difficult to trace. We now know that many terrorists 
were able to meet and exchange ideas while studying at 
the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in the Soviet 
Union. Shultz describes the training the Soviets 
provided as a "university education." The actual 
emphasis was on indoctrination in Marxist ideology, 
tailored to Third World revolutionaries who were then 
tasked to carry the message back to their homelands.
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The students were also trained in such areas as weapons
and explosive operations— handy skills for potential 
l ̂terrorists.
Other training camps for terrorists have been 
established, with the help of the PLO, in various places 
throughout the Middle East. Would-be terrorists from 
Europe, Latin America and Asia receive extensive 
schooling in the techniques of terrorist warfare.
The Venezualian-born legend, Ilyich Ramirez 
Sanchez, better known as "Carlos the Jackal", epitomizes 
the strength terrorists have when forces are combined in 
cooperative ventures. In the mid-1960s, Carlos attended 
Patrice Lumumba Friendship University where he quickly 
gained a reputation as a radical leader. But Carlos' 
activities were perhaps even too unorthodox for his 
teachers because he was asked to leave the university in 
1969. Smith believes Carlos showed such promise as a 
potential terrorist that Moscow wanted to be able to 
legitimately disavow any overt association with him.
They therefore expelled him from the university, 
apparently as a guise to provide distance. It was 
during his schooling in the Soviet Union that Carlos 
established ties with the PLO.14 Goren described 
Carlos as having links with the Red Brigade, RAF and 
Central and South American groups as well as the 
Japanese Red Army (JRA). She states that the Popular
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Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) also
claimed him as having been one of their members.15
Carlos aided other terrorist groups by providing money,
arms and intelligence information. Dobson and Payne
list at least five major European terrorist attacks,
during a period of less than two years, in which Carlos
was implicated. In July of 1975, "the Jackal" killed
two French detectives and a Lebanese informer in a
Paris apartment house during what the detectives
apparently believed was a routine questioning session.
Further investigation into the matter revealed Carlos
had stockpiles of arms, forgery equipment, maps of
bombed buildings and lists of potential targets.15
Carlos was also believed to be the mastermind of
at least two operations by the JRA, a combined
organization of student groups which sprang up in Japan
after World War II. Laqueur notes that,
The Japanese terrorists, even more than the West 
Germans, took a prominent part in transnational 
terrorism; frequently in collaboration with 
Palestinians, but also with the 'Carlos’ 
gang . . . .17
Goren points to the 1972 Lod airport massacre as 
evidence of the beginnings of terrorist group 
collaboration. Three JRA members, arriving at Tel Aviv 
from Paris, picked up their luggage, extracted automatic 
weapons and hand grenades from their luggage and began
indiscriminately killing civilians in the terminal 
area.*® Twenty-eight people were killed and at least 
seventy more wounded. This action, although carried out 
by three members of the JRA, was actually accomplished 
on behalf of the PFLP, reportedly in gratitude and as 
repayment for logistics support and weapons training 
received by JRA members. According to Goren, several 
other JRA/PFLP operations were conducted from 1972 to 
1975 which laid the groundwork for broader cooperative 
terrorist ventures. There later was evidence of 
cooperation between Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
Provisionals and Black nationalist guerrillas for 
actions in Rhodesia and Mozambique. Goren also notes 
that IRA members are rumored to have been trained in PLO 
camps in the Middle East.
West German terrorist groups, created in the mid 
1960s, have a history of inter-group cooperation which, 
according to Levi and Rodriguez, today has spread beyond 
European borders. Initially, three left-wing terrorist 
groups in Germany were responsible for most incidents: 
The RAF— borrowing their name from Mao's Red Army— the 
Revolutionary Cells (RZ), and the 2nd of June Movement 
(2JM). A significant level of cooperation between West 
German groups was evidenced in 1975 when the 2JM worked 
with the RAF to kidnap a West Berlin mayoral candidate. 
The operation was successful in that terrorist demands
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for money, transport to a safehaven and the release of 
six imprisoned terrorists were met. Encouraged by this 
success, continued terrorist operations often involved 
two or more groups and the targets of the attacks were 
generally U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)-affiliated interests.
Italian and French terrorist groups also made a 
transition from national/homeland targets to U.S. and 
NATO interests in the late 1970s. Having a "common 
enemy" in the "imperialistic" U.S. helped solidify 
inter-group ties and provided a focus for terrorist 
activity.
Terrorism in Central and South America is 
generally used as an instrument of insurgent groups when 
attempting to gain power for a particular regime.
Because many of the countries affected by terrorism are 
"democracies" in name only— without the true support of 
the population— leadership is often equivocal. Strong 
military opposition to insurgent groups has tended to 
drive revolutionaries to terrorist tactics. Bombings 
and kidnappings, for example, are more economical to 
accomplish and less risky than open warfare for an 
outnumbered and overpowered force. While the growth of 
these Latin insurgent groups is steadily rising and the 
level of terrorism is on the increase, the threat to 
U.S. interests is generally considered minimal.
The history of terrorism in the Middle East is 
often described in the media as an outgrowth of broken 
promises and frustration. Alternately shunned and 
dominated by western powers, Middle Eastern countries 
have begun to emerge as independent states with a 
powerful trump card to use against enemies: oil.
Nationalism and religious Islamic fundamentalism have a 
natural adversary and target in the state of Israel. 
Added to this already explosive environment are the many 
religious factions vying for power, yet finding it 
difficult to coexist. These ingredients have literally 
propelled the Middle East into a terrorist haven over 
the last decade. Cooperation among Arab states and a 
variety of religious factions is standard fare there, as 
is a policy aimed at the destruction of Israel and the 
weakening of the United States.
The legacy of Carlos with his influence on 
European and Middle Eastern terrorist groups, is today a 
problem plaguing those who must develop strategies and 
policies to counter the growing popularity of intergroup 
terrorist cooperation. Modern terrorist tactics have 
become important not only because of the power created 
by strength of numbers, but also because of an 
increasing technological complexity. For example, the 
intergroup cooperation, which began merely as a means to 
increase logistical capabilities, now serves to further
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complicate counterterrorism efforts. Despite initial
contention in the early 1980s that there was a "network
of terrorism" backed by the Soviet Union, later reports 
90disproved this.
Laqueur points to an international terrorist 
congress which took place in January 1986 in Frankfurt, 
West Germany, as evidence of continuing coordination and 
collaboration among terrorist organizations. Among the 
representatives at the congress were German, French, 
Belgium, Spanish and Portuguese nationals, as well as 
members of the PLO, PFLP, African National Congress,
O 1 ,IRA, the Tupamaros and the Red Brigade. Thus, it is 
no longer evident, based on logical deduction of 
political motives, which terrorist group is directly 
responsible for given terrorist attacks.
In December 1988, a Pan American airliner enroute 
from London to New York blew apart over the Scottish 
village of Lockerbie, killing 259 people on board, many 
of them American citizens. Early indicators clearly 
signalled a terrorist attack. While labelled by the 
U.S. an "intolerable act," determining the source of the 
attack has proven difficult. A British newspaper 
claimed that the plane was sabotaged by Iranian 
terrorists aided by Libya. The attack was presumed by 
media analysts to be in retaliation for an Iranian 
Airbus accidentally shot down over the Persian Gulf by a
U.S. Navy warship during the summer of 1988. West
German newspaper reporters asserted that the attack was
planned by IRA terrorists aided by a Palestinian group
and Libya. PLO representatives have implied that the
bomb on board the plane was planted by Israeli agents in
order to undermine U.S. negotiations with the
Palestinian group. Thus, while the U.S. is eager for an
opportunity to react to this particular terrorist
incident, without firm knowledge of the guilty parties,
any action would be counterproductive or meaningless.
Not only would the possibility be high of a reaction
aimed at an innocent party, but the value of any
counterterrorist policy would be diminished. Motley
sums up the current state of affairs:
The increasing coordination among terrorist 
groups committed to eliminating U.S. influence 
and presence from the Middle East and Europe 
requires new thinking about the nature and 
character of international terrorism.22
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Chapter III 
A Typology of Terrorism
The classification of terrorist groups is an 
ominous task— tantamount in many respects to the elusive 
undertaking of defining terrorism. A high potential 
exists for disparity, particularly with regard to the 
variables utilized in coordination of the classification 
scheme. And, as is often evident in published 
typologies, a clear conceptualization of the term 
"terrorism" was often not made prior to further study. 
While, admittedly, the body of knowledge which comprises 
the study of terrorism is in the embryonic state, the 
literature seems quite consumed with the task of 
categorization of terrorist groups.
The ability to classify terrorist groups based on 
a uniform set of variables could provide analysts with a 
structured database from which to conduct further 
analysis. The resultant typology also would then be 
capable of empirical substantiation through 
comprehensive research. The ambiguity inherent in the 
terminology related to terrorist groups inhibits 
critical evaluation of the merit of current typologies. 
While typologies differ with regard to the number and
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type of factors considered, some variables generally 
included are; goals, motivation, size, support 
mechanisms, targets selected and tactics utilized by the 
group.
The "ideal" terrorism typology would compress the 
unique set of variables related to individual groups 
into general categories. However, typologies rarely 
consider all of the above listed variables and often 
fail in consistency regarding the factors which are used 
to identify given groups. For example, one typology may 
classify the PLO as a "nationalist" group based on the 
goal or motivation aspect but conversely label the 
Tupamaros of Uruguay under a "Latin American terrorism" 
heading based upon geographic location. This type of 
inconsistency makes cross-group comparison difficult, if 
not impossible, because different descriptors were used 
to classify the groups.
Early Classification Schemes
Early distinctions of terrorist groups were based 
on what Stohl and Schmid term "a group-based 
classification scheme."* Attempts were made by the 
FBI, the CIA, Rand Corporation and others to extract 
data that would comprehensively describe terrorist 
groups. Concepts such as "left-wing" and "right-wing" 
were often used to assess political orientations of
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groups but the criteria were not adequately defined. 
Generally, a left-wing group was, as Levy and Rodriguez 
describe, "fueled by the world Marxist Revolutionary 
movement with the support of the Soviet Union, Cuba and 
China. . . .
Early studies of terrorism merely described 
terrorist inicidents over periods of time, listing such 
variables as location (by country) of a terrorist 
incident and the group claiming responsibility for the 
act (by name of group). This distinction provided 
researchers with little more than a chronology of 
terrorism, but it did allow early researchers to study 
regional patterns of activity. Other group-based 
classifications of terrorism used ambiguous terms such 
as "ultraleft anarchist" and "neofascist and extreme 
right wing groups." There existed, however, little 
consistency between researchers: Mickolus labels the
JRA as ultraleft anarchist; Kumamoto puts them in an 
anarchist/nihilist category; Shults and Sloan find the 
JRA to be an ideological extremist group; Johnson 
categorizes them as ideological mercenaries. Thus, the 
use of imprecise terms and unsubstantiated assumptions 
left a wide disparity when comparing group-based 
typologies. Stohl finds that group-based typologies 
provide the researcher with only general knowledge that 
has not been empirically tested.^ Many of these
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typologies are informal and based mainly on the 
ideological background of the terrorist group.
It is often difficult to isolate the ideology of a 
terrorist group from other factors. Alexander and 
Gleason list a terrorist group typology based on the 
following ideological schemes: ethnic, religious,
nationalist, Marxist-Leninist, anarchist, Neofascist, 
extreme right wing, ideological mercenaries, and 
pathological.^ Kumamoto presents a similar typology 
with labels such as nationalist/separatist, 
socialist/revolutionary, anarchist/nihilist, 
Neofascist/extreme right wing and pathological.® 
Scholars, however, have not reached consensus as to 
which groups best fit into particular categories. In 
order to further expand the variables utilized to 
differentiate terrorist groups, authors added such 
variables as motivation and objectives.
Motivational typologies focus attention on the 
goals or aims of the terrorists. According to Flemming, 
Schmid and Stohl, these types of classifications are 
often found in literature related to terrorist 
countermeasures.® The problem with purely 
motivational typologies, however, is that they do not 
address the tactics of the terrorist group. Groups 
exist which may have similar goals but which achieve 
goals in varying ways. For example, separatist or
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nationalist Palestinian groups may all desire 
independence, but various factions may have diverse 
views about the tactics to use. Wilkinson suggests that 
a classification scheme specifically address the "form" 
of terrorism employed. He suggests four categories of 
terrorism: war terrorism; repressive terror used by
rulers or regimes; revolutionary terror against 
governments; and subrevolutionary terror. In his 1979 
revision he added aims and objectives of terrorist 
groups as a means of more precise categorization.'
Further delineation of terrorist typologies 
attempt to include the functional variables of tactics 
and targets. Fattah discusses immediate and secondary 
targets; appropriate and inappropriate targets; 
accessible; and inaccessible targets; and personalized
pand generalized targets. Bell lists the specific
tactics generally seen in various forms of terrorism.
Criminal terror, for example, encompasses air piracy,
kidnappings and extortion; psychotic terror involves
threats or attempts on the lives of political 
9figures.3
Advanced Classification Schemes
More intricate typologies have evolved which are 
designed to consider terrorist group "causation" as well 
as support mechanisms. Thus, terms such as
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"international, transnational, domestic and state 
terrorism" are generally contained within what Stohl 
labels origin-based typologies.*® Environmental 
factors are often added as variables in these 
typologies. These factors generally are lists which 
help to ascertain the geographic area of concern of 
specific groups. Still, debate exists as to which 
groups fall within the categories. Some terrorist 
groups, for instance, perpetrate violence both "at home" 
and in the international arena.
In an attempt to demonstrate the changing nature 
of terrorist motivation in the 1980s, Hoffman examines 
the underlying ethical foundations of this type of 
violence. He compressed all terrorist activity into two 
categories: secular-political and religious-political.
He characterizes the secular political actor as one who 
desires power in the form of a separate nation-state, a 
socialist state or an authoritarian state. This actor's 
main objective is sociopolitical change in the world.
The religious-political terrorist desires change also, 
but motives are based on religious or theological 
imperatives. Hoffman states that, "rather than 
regarding violence as a means to an end, these groups 
often view violence as an end in itself."**
Psychological profiles of terrorists have also 
become popular, particularly among scholars. Gurr views
40
the merits of this analytical approach on two levels.
In one respect, psychological analysis of individual 
terrorists helps to answer the questions of motivation. 
Biographical sketches and interviews with terrorist 
operatives can also aid in the assessment and 
identification of personnel, revelation of individual 
modus operandi, and profiling of potential actors or 
favored tactics. Gurr posits an interesting 
psychological typology that deals with recruitment of 
terrorists. He states that the "making" of a terrorist 
proceeds through three phases:
(1) At the first stage an existing organization 
which advocates political violence attracts 
potential recruits from young people in groups 
which already have intense grievances. . . .
(2). . .new members are socialized into the 
organization's goals and subjected to 
encouragement and pressure. . . .
(3) . . .the utilitarian mode of behavior becomes 
increasingly important. . .committment to the 
group. . .rationalistic mode of thought. . . .
Gurr's typology attempts to explain the thought 
process that a terrorist goes through in order to become 
a part of the group. He must first be committed to a 
political cause which he feels he can win. The 
socialization process further solidifies the individual 
into a mode of thought that puts the group's goals 
before his own. Finally, the potential terrorist uses 
rationalization to dispel any feelings of doubt about 
the methods practiced— the group has become all 
important.
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Similar to psychological profiling of terrorists
is examination of the values and beliefs of terrorists.
Crenshaw states that terrorist belief system analysis
has been an area of neglect in the overall study of the
field. She believes that,
A general framework for the analysis of the 
content of terrorist belief systems is necessary 
as a basis for case studies of individual 
organizations and as a means of comparing 
and classifying different types of terrorist 
groups.13
Analysts should strive to understand the "enemy" 
world view, the view of his organization and his 
attitude toward western democracies. If terrorists 
envision part of their overall strategy as encompassing 
self-sacrifice, it obviously implies that a deterrent 
strategy involving physical punishment would only serve 
the interests of the terrorists.
Looking at the evolution of typologies, Stohl 
attempts to "establish a research tradition that 
recognizes the utility of previous analyses. " The 
overall comprehensive classification scheme consists of 
four main elements and is intended to serve as building 
blocks for future studies. The first element to be 
considered is that of political motivation. Within this 
heading the ideology of a group is considered. Such 
factors as anarchism, nihilism, left wing/right wing, 
religious and cultural orientation are considered. Also 
under this topic is territorial orientation— separatism,
nationalism or anticolonialism. In the second category, 
the authors differentiate between the geopolitical 
origins of groups. One would ask, for example, if the 
terrorist group is indigenous, foreign or colonial? The 
third category encompasses institutional orientation.
The determination of the basic targets of a group, such 
as nongovernment targets or state targets, can aid in 
the overall evaluation of the latitude of terrorist 
activity. Finally, this typology addresses the focus of 
attention of terrorist organizations: social
revolutionary, single issue, anarchy or repressive.
Comprehensive Typology of Terrorism
While the above three-dimensional classification 
scheme attempts to draw together the most important 
aspects of the variables influencing terrorist behavior, 
for the purpose of a counterterrorist strategy it falls 
short. In order to deter future terrorism, the 
variables describing the terrorist group must be 
directly linked to possible countermeasures. Thus, the 
following target group variables should be considered:
- Overt State Affiliations
- International Mobility
- Financial Support Mechanisms
- Lethal Potentialities
- Strategic Goals
- Tactical Objectives
- Basic Group Ideology
- Elements of Group Schism Possibilities
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- Technological Capabilities
- Infiltration Possibilities
- Inter-Group Affiliations
- Geographic Location of Group
The purpose of classifying terrorist groups 
according to the above typology is to enable the analyst 
to look for vulnerabilities in each organization. For 
example, the Red Brigade organization in Italy 
discovered that the kidnapping of U.S. Army Brigadier 
General Dozier was counterproductive to their cause: 
the resultant anti-terror crack-down by Italian police 
left the group with few members out of jail.
Examples of other possible terrorist 
vulnerabilities include: internal power struggles;
difficulties in acquisition and transport of high 
performance weaponry; problems with out-of-country safe 
haven; susceptibility to counter-propaganda; physical 
security problems; target selection; increase in 
financial support needs; need for frequent relocations; 
and personnel problems of motivation, discontent and 
deprivations.
Each countermeasure has specific applicability to 
certain group variables. For example, in order to apply 
a diplomatic sanction, decision-makers should consider 
the overt state affiliation of the group, its geographic 
location, the international mobility of the group, the 
inter-group affiliation and the strategic goals and
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tactical objectives of the group. Economic sanctions 
would be most appropriately applied to groups with state 
affiliation. However, other factors to consider include 
financial support mechanism, technological capabilities 
and the goals of the group. The use of force as a 
sanction should be undertaken with caution and with as 
much knowledge about a terrorist group as possible.
Major factors, however, are the lethal potentialities of 
the group, its strategic goals and tactical objectives. 
Special operations and covert operations also require 
the decision-makers to know as much as possible about 
the particular target. They also should take into 
consideration the possibility of a schism in the group, 
the basic group ideology and the probability of 
successful infiltration of the group.
The old adage, "A chain is only as strong as its 
weakest link," also applies to terrorist situations. A 
comprehensive background analysis of organizations and 
methods involved in terrorist activity can provide 
information on the "weak link." That particular area 
can then be addressed by the most appropriate 
countermeasure— military force, diplomatic, legal, 
economic or other sanctions.
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Chapter IV 
Counterterrorism Options
Conventional wisdom on counterterrorism is 
polarized: while it seems nothing can really be done
about the problem, it is apparent that some type of 
strategy is necessary. As of yet, no all-encompassing 
plan exists to obliterate the complex causes and effects 
of terrorism. The frustration felt by powerful 
countries who tend to be the victims of this violence, 
however, has led to some reasonable options in the 
battle for political control.
Celmer notes that the United States' 
counterterrorism policy is based on a five-point 
program. These points include: overt and covert
intelligence operations; diplomatic efforts; economic 
steps; legislative initiatives; and military 
operations.-^ Finding the most appropriate option to 
employ against a potential or known adversary, however, 
requires a consistent yet flexible strategy backed by 
decisive action. States that openly sponsor and harbor 
terrorist groups, for example, can be dealt with through 
economic sanctions if that is their greatest area of 
weakness.
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Policy Considerations
According to Sederberg, one characteristic of a 
strong democracy is its commitment to the rule of 
law. This commitment serves a twofold purpose:
First, it ensures the relative legitimacy of the state 
by instituting legally structured policies of control. 
Furthermore, the rule of law also inhibits the 
development of responses to terrorism that may be 
indiscriminate and conflict with constitutional as well 
as human rights. Thus, any policy adopted by the United 
States to fight terrorism must be cognizant of the legal 
and moral constraints imposed on it by virtue of its 
symbolic position in the world as the "great democracy." 
Formulating an acceptable counterterrorism plan becomes 
even more complicated for the United States because our 
vulnerability to an attack lies not within our own 
shores, but far away on foreign soil and in the air.
Other democracies, like Israel, who are not 
subjected to the close scrutiny of world opinion, are 
able to affect a counterterrorism policy consistent with 
state goals. According to O'Brien, Israel's basic 
counterterror strategy was firmly established by 1967.
He calls it a policy of deterrence through 
preventive/attrition strikes. He further states that,
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These strikes were aimed at three related types 
of targets. First/ they were primarily counter­
force attacks on terrorist forces, bases and 
facilities. Second, they usually inflicted 
collateral damage since terrorist bases were 
generally collocated with civilian targets. 
Israel sought to minimize collateral damage 
but contended that persons living close to 
terrorist bases and supporting or tolerating 
terrorist operations must expect (emphasis 
added) to suffer from Israeli counterterror 
strikes. Third, Israeli counterterror attacks 
were generally conducted in the soverign 
territory of a neighboring Arab state and were 
intended to influence that state's behavior.
Whenever possible, the Israeli government does not 
negotiate with terrorists, although Israel has made a 
number of exceptions to this rule. And, in the course 
of a hijacking or hostage-taking incident, the policy is 
to kill the terrorists at all costs, even if it means a 
loss of Israeli civilian life.
The Israeli policy was adopted in response to 
terrorist attacks by Palestinians after the 1967 June 
war. O'Brien believes that slim prospects of an Arab 
victory following this conventional conflict led the way 
for terrorism. Thus, ". . .the PLO emerged as a 
quasi-independent political-military actor, determined 
to wage a war of national liberation."4 Opponents of 
this often-controversial policy are forced into silence 
by the apparent overwhelming approval of the strategy by 
the Israeli population. The goals of the state— to 
deter, prevent or retaliate— are met.
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Unlike that of Israel, the counterterrorism policy
of the U.S. government is often veiled in political
ambiguity. The goal of deterring terrorism is
constantly weighed against such competing factors as
economic stability, foreign relations, popular opinion
and other issues that dominate current events. Celmer
believes that the U.S. response to international
terrorism is, "...based on a complex and broad array of
programs designed to enhance the prevention of,
deterrence of, response to and prediction of terrorist
behavior."'* Celmer admits, however, that
Congressional examinations of the U.S. antiterrorist
program have exposed key weaknesses that need
correction. Too many agencies are often vying for a
part in the overall strategy. Robert Oakley, former
Director for the State Department's Office for
Counter-terrorism and Emergency Planning complained,
. . . before an antiterrorist plan can be 
implemented, his office must consult with other 
State Department agencies, the Defense Department, 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National 
Security Agency and the White House.
The very nature of our democracy, however, demands 
that bureaucratic politics be a notable consideration 
in any strategy. Because of the complexity of the 
terrorism problem facing the American government, the 
solutions also require coordinated effort.
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Fighting terrorism on a strategic level is most 
difficult because each group has a unique set of goals 
it hopes to achieve. On a tactical level, however, 
Celmer states that each terrorist group has the common 
goals of publicity. "Through this coverage, he says, "a 
terrorist group seeks to demonstrate to and inform the 
general public of its existence and create an atmosphere 
that promotes revolutionary behavior."'
It is the terroristic behavior that produces 
publicity which must be countered through a consistent 
policy effort. There are three obvious responses to 
counter the terrorist menace: prevent it; react after
an incident; or do nothing at all. The response model 
that is being developed is intended to provide 
policymakers with a means to "react" to terrorism. 
Prevention, while always a first priority, is difficult 
to measure in terms of success rates. It may be 
possible, however, to preempt a terrorist act by taking 
specific action against the group, based on the model 
developed. The key is to look for vulnerabilities 
within the terrorist group itself and within the state 
supporting the terrorism and thereby exploit those 
weaknesses.
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Chapter V 
Legal Responses
Examining the basis of counterterrorism policy 
calls first for a look at the domestic and international 
laws designed to allow our government to respond. As 
early as 1784, America was forced to deal with the 
hijacking of U.S. vessels and needed to create a legal 
means to sanction offenders. Thomas Jefferson remarked 
that, "an insult unpunished is the parent of others." 
This attitude also seems to be prevalent in modern 
times.
Domestic Initiatives
From 1972 to 1988, each Congress has recognized 
the importance of security measures established to 
prevent and deter violence against the U.S. The 
devasting reality of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre 
created an atmosphere of awareness of the threat posed 
by political terrorism in the international arena. The 
Ninety-Second Congress (1972-73) passed a resolution 
unanimously in both chambers of Congress calling for 
suspension of aid to nations that support or sanction 
terrorism. The resolution, however, was vague in that
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it did not specify what nations or what aid would be 
suspended.
Shortly thereafter the Ninety-Fourth Congress 
(1975-76), adopted language barring aid to any country 
that aids or abets, by granting sanction from 
prosecution, groups or individuals who commit terrorist 
acts. The President has the power to waive this ban for 
national security reasons, but Congress can override 
that action within 30 days.
The Ninety-Fifth (1977-78) and the Ninety-Seventh 
Congresses (1981-82) were concerned with controlling 
the export of nuclear fuels and technology. Monies were 
allocated to protect nuclear and chemical sites and 
various organizations were restructured to respond to 
terrorism. The Ninety-Sixth Congress (1979-80) 
allocated $2.3 million to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation intelligence program to combat domestic 
terrorism.
The Ninety-Eighth Congress (1983-84) was concerned 
with improving security at U.S. embassies and the 
Ninety-Ninth Congress (1985-86) restricted aid to 
countries that aid in terrorism. It also gave the 
President the power to stop airline flights to countries 
whose airports did not meet security standards. 
International agreements with allies to stop terrorism 
were also recommended. The One Hundredth Congress
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(1987-88) passed a resolution to bar the proliferation 
of plastic handguns which can slip through airport 
security and be used by terrorists in hi j ackings . •*•
Perhaps more significant than additional funds, 
extra security measures and extradition treaties, are 
the measures that were defeated. The 1986 
Anti-Terrorist Act, while never passed, would have 
authorized the President to use any means, to include 
deadly force, to deal with terrorist acts committed 
against Americans by foreigners. This legislation would 
also have provided a legal basis for preemptive strikes 
and strikes against terrorist supporters.
The Executive Branch of government also has the 
power to construct the legal means to fight the battle of 
terrorism. When President Eeagan enacted National 
Security Decision Directive 138 (NSD 138) in April of 
1984, he initiated proactive, self-help measures 
designed to strike back at terrorism. NSD 138 
represents a decision, in principle, to use force to 
combat terrorism and calls for a greater use of covert 
actions, counterintelligence operations and the 
establishment of and use of small military and 
para-military operations designed to target 
international terrorists and their bases. Celmer 
believes that while the U.S. may now have the "will" and 
the legal means to fight terrorists, we have not shown a
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consistency in action to prepare for the battle. He 
cites the selling of weapons to Iran in hopes of freeing 
U.S. hostages in Lebanon as a good example of a 
hypocritical policy which did much to weaken 
international counterterrorist cooperation.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has also 
recently been given a greater role in the investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist activity both at home and 
abroad. The 1978 FBI investigation into the death of 
Congressman Leo J. Ryan and the wounding of Deputy Chief 
of Mission Richard Dwyer while they were visiting 
Jonestown, Guyana provided some authority for the Bureau 
to investigate crimes overseas. Larry Layton was 
eventually prosecuted for the crime and the district 
court concluded that a federal crime was committed if 
the victim was an internationally protected person who, 
at the time of the offense, represented the U.S. in a 
foreign country, even if the offender was not within the 
"territorial jurisdiction" of the U.S. at the time of 
the offense. This precedent-setting case, along with 
presidential and congressional legislation and 
international treaties has enabled the FBI to establish 
functional, logistical and operational liaison between 
the investigative foreign law enforcement agency, the 
American Embassy, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
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and U.S. military intelligence gencies in the country
. . ?in which terrorist incidents occur.
Case Study #1
A prime example of using legal means to snare a 
terrorist is the case of Fawas Younis, the first 
terrorist overseas to be brought to the U.S. to stand 
trial. He was accused of taking three Americans hostage 
aboard a Royal Jordanian jet in Beirut, Lebanon, on 
June 11, 1985. Although the Americans were later 
released unharmed, hostage-taking is a violation of 
American law. The FBI successfully coordinated 
information from the CIA and the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) to mount the operation against Younis. Using a 
Lebanese DEA informant who was a friend of Younis', the 
CIA was able to record a clear account of the hijacking 
and hostage-taking incident. With the evidence in hand, 
the agencies needed a legal means to bring the criminal 
to the U.S. without entering any other country's 
soverign territory in order to preclude any possible 
extradition questions. Younis was lured to a meeting 
aboard a boat for the purpose of making contact with a 
drug-runner. The phony meeting took place aboard a 
yacht in international waters and from there FBI agents 
were able to arrest him and eventually transfer him to 
the United States.4 The message was then clear to
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would-be terrorists— this country is capable of using 
lawful means to bring criminals to justice.
International Legal Sanctions
Agents in the Younis case took care to avoid the 
entanglement of other countries' laws. Nevertheless, 
some agreements have been reached on an international 
scale that support and encourage legal cooperation 
between nations. International conventions and regional 
agreements provide a solid basis in theory from which to 
combat terrorism.
Six international conventions supported by United 
Nations members have, in some form, addressed the 
problems of international terrorism. Examples include 
the Tokyo (1963), Hague (1970) and Montreal (1973) 
conventions which conferred extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to try alleged offenders. The treaties also 
provided for the death penalty when the death of another 
person results from the commission or the attempted 
commission of the offense.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention relates 
to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.
It also provides that the commission of violence, 
including murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, 
taking of hostages and other humiliating and degrading 
treatment is considered a violation of the laws of war
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and is subject to criminal sanction. This article is 
applicable even if a state of war is not officially 
recognized by one of the parties.
The New York and Hostage Conventions concentrate 
on protecting diplomatic personnel and preventing and 
punishing the taking of hostages. The key feature of 
all of these conferences requires that an alleged 
offender either be extradited or prosecuted.
While most legal initiatives to counter terrorism 
have met with little success, exceptions are possible in 
the areas where there is an international consensus of 
opinion. The heads of state and government of Canada, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan,
United Kingdom and the United States initiated an 
anti-hijacking declaration at Bonn, W. Germany, in 1978. 
This later became known as the Bonn Declaration. It 
calls for signatories to cease all flights to and from 
any country which does not extradite or prosecute 
terrorists.® The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Antiterrorism Act of 1986 is also an example of 
international cooperation to protect official diplomats 
in foreign countries.
Regional agreements, specifically within NATO 
countries, may be a promising forum for developing a 
policy consensus on responses to terrorism. In the 
past, however, European members have resisted efforts by
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the U.S. to mount a cooperative response. Problems with 
the interface of national police agencies, differences 
in laws, the sharing of intelligence and the issue of 
national sovereignty are areas that remain sensitive to 
international concerns. Furthermore, enforcement of any 
legal agreement must be undertaken by some designated 
group. The International Criminal Police Organization 
(Interpol) is strictly forbidden to intervene in any 
activities of a political, military, religious or social 
nature by its constitution. This limitation reduces 
Interpol's effectiveness to activity only AFTER an 
incident has occurred, providinig no real deterrent 
value to fighting terrorism.
Case Study #2
Withstanding any international legal agreements to 
counter terrorist violence, a political will to act 
jointly in a venture must also be present. In March 
1981, a Pakistani International Airlines jet enroute 
from Karachi to Peshawar was hijacked to Kabul, 
Afghanistan, by Pakistani political dissidents. After 
killing a Pakistani diplomat on board the aircraft, the 
hijackers flew to Damascus, Syria, and began 
negotiations with the Pakistani government. After ten 
days Pakistan agreed to all of the terrorists' demands in 
exchange for the remaining hostages. As part of the
deal, the criminals received safe passage to Kabul.
While Pakistan demanded extradition of the hijackers, 
Afghanistani officials denied it claiming that they 
would punish the terrorists themselves. In response to 
what western countries perceived as harboring hijackers 
the signatories to the Bonn Declaration acted in concert 
to suspend all flights to Afghanistan. This unity of 
action by various countries was unprecedented— proving 
that collective action is possible. A major weakness, 
however, identified by Levitt occurs when one of the 
"enforcer" countries is politically involved in the 
sanction. None of the countries suspending airline 
flights had any particular political dealings with 
Afghanistan. Thus, Levitt states, "The efforts to 
enforce an international norm against hijackers suffer 
to the extent that such an effort is affected by 
extraneous political considerations."7
Case Study #3
In the case of the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 
June 1985, international cooperation to ban airline 
flights to Lebanon was solicited by the U.S. but never 
received. The hijacked airline was enroute from Athens 
to Rome and diverted to Beirut by the terrorists shortly 
after takeoff. During the ordeal, U.S. Navy diver 
Robert Stetham was tortured and murdered by the
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hijackers. The remaining hostages and terrorists were 
eventually freed through the intervention of Syria. The 
U.S., frustrated by an inability to resolve the matter, 
announced it was closing Beirut airport because it had 
become a "free fire zone." The measure stated that no 
Lebanese airlines would be allowed to fly to the U.S. 
and no flights by any airline would be permitted between 
the U.S. and Lebanon. President Reagan called for 
international support for his program, but not one 
country joined the boycott.
Levitt argues that the U.S. response was 
unsuccessful in this case because the action was 
inappropriate and the U.S. government failed to consult 
other countries before announcing the sanctions. If 
Reagan had consulted West European governments, he would 
have realized, says Levitt, that there are fundamental 
political differences between the U.S. and Western 
Europe over Middle East policies. The Lebanese 
government did not fit the Bonn Declaration paradigm of 
a government willing to harbor and aid hijackers. 
Therefore, the signatories to that agreement did not
Ofeel m  any way legally bound to comply with it.
Extradition
Murphy notes that there is no universal rule of 
customary international law or international convention
which obligates the extradition of offenders to the 
requesting country. Rather, there exists multilateral 
and bilateral treaties which generally provide for the 
delivery of persons charged with crimes within the 
territorial jurisdiction of one state who attempt asylum 
within the bounds of another. Multilateral agreements 
for extradition have taken place based on either 
geographic proximity or political affinity. The 
principal aim of most of these regional agreements,
according to Murphy is to establish uniform rules in the
. . Qhopes of achieving greater unity.
Much more commonly called upon to resolve 
international legal problems are bilateral extradition 
treaties. The U.S. has treaties with over 100 
countries. While each treaty is unique, several 
principles are universally recognized. Usually, the 
treaty lists the crimes, mainly felonies, for which 
extradition will be granted. The offense must be a 
crime in both the requesting state and the state of 
asylum and must be punishable by a stipulated minimum 
penalty, usually one year. Some important exceptions to 
the obligation to surrender fugitives are often 
specified in treaties. Offenses that deal with 
military, religious and fiscal crimes can be excluded 
from the terms of the agreement if specified. Perhaps 
the most common exception is that of political offense.
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The political offense exception is defined in 
general terms by McLaughlin as, "...offenses directed 
against the state or governmental system or against a 
rival group in a struggle for political power."10 
Most political offenses are crimes that would normally 
be extraditable but that are excepted when committed 
with a political objective. The U.S. has always been 
proud of its reputation as a "bastion of freedom" and, as 
such, has been reluctant to excise the political offense 
exception from its treaties. In recent years, the 
ambiguity over what constitutes a "political" crime has 
caused interpretation difficulties between the U.S. 
and several allies, principally Great Britain, Italy and 
Mexico. Until 1985, members of the IRA who committed 
extraditable offenses in Northern Ireland and sought 
asylum in the U.S., fell under the political offense 
exception. In June 1985, however, a new treaty between 
the U.S. and the British included a list of violent 
crimes— which would not henceforth be considered 
political in nature. The exceptions included murder, 
kidnapping, aircraft hijacking and the planting of 
explosives which could result in personal injury.
Case Study #4
Still, problems exist with other international 
extradition treaties. McLaughlin points out that there
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are problems when a citizen of one state commits a crime 
in a second state against a citizen of a third 
state.*1 For example, in 1977 the French refused to 
extradite Abu Daoud, a member of the Palestinian 
terrorist group who captured and killed eight Israeli 
athletes to Israel because the treaty between France and 
Israel did not provide for the extradition of persons 
who had committed crimes outside Israel. In another 
example, West Germany refused to extradite Mohammed Ali 
Hamadei, a Palestinian from Lebanon wanted in the 1985 
hijacking of a TWA jet, because of the possible death 
sentence that could have been imposed. After the U.S. 
agreed to forego the death sentence, West German
authorities decided to try Hamadei as a juvenile because
. . 1 9he was 16 at the time of the crime. 4
Compounding the legal problem of extradition, 
Levitt finds that there are also diplomatic 
sensitivities that must be considered. During the 
debate about whether to release Hamadei to the U.S., two 
West German citizens were taken hostage in Beirut. The 
kidnapping was directly linked to the treatment of 
Hamadei and in particular, his nonextradition to the 
U.S.13
Summary
Essential ingredients of a collective response to 
terrorism are outlined by Levitt as credibility,
consensus, consistency and clarity.14 These prime 
factors are rarely present in all situations and the 
U.S. is forced into action either alone or with a 
limited number of allies. Planning contingencies, 
however, may allow the U.S. effective policy options 
without escalating the political situation. Using the 
typology of terrorism in Chapter III, those terrorist 
organizations vulnerable to legal sanctions, such as 
extradition and prosecution, can be identified. A 
terrorist group's geographic area of operation raises 
the obvious questions of treaties or conventions in 
place with which to respond. Other areas of concern 
mentioned in the typology include the group's mechanism 
for support and the key tactics utilized. The past 
tactics practiced by a group can also provide clues to 
the best possible means to implement the law to counter 
terrorism.
Legal santions almost always require the 
cooperation of other countries through the use of 
specific treaties/conventions and in general an attitude 
much like that of the U.S. Nevertheless, sensitive 
political considerations cannot be overlooked and all 
states involved need an in-depth understanding of the 
judicial and political systems of its allies.
Extradition treaties must be specific enough to 
include persons responsible for terrorist actions. The
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political offense exception, while appropriate in 
instances where persons are prosecuted because of their 
beliefs, is not an appropriate defense when heinous 
crimes are committed. All counterterrorism measures 
must be enacted in accordance with lawful treaties or in 
response to unilateral laws passed or enacted in this 
country. Action that extends beyond the boundaries of 
the law is counterproductive in a democracy based on the 
rule of law.
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Chapter VI 
Economic Sanctions
As terrorist activity continues to claim American 
lives and destroy property around the world, politicians 
explore avenues they hope will bring a quick and 
efficient halt to the menace. One of these measures, 
economic policy, is often envisaged as a means to not 
only improve American livelihood, but also as an 
instrument of political policy capable of manipulating 
states' actions to coincide with U.S. interests.
Much like military options, which must be tempered 
in a democratic environment, economic sanctions in a 
capitalist society are subject to the considerations of 
a free market environment. Sayre believes that because 
of the potential disruption to trade, economic sanctions 
rarely, if ever, work.* However, if the U.S. 
determines that a state is supporting or abeting 
terrorist activity, steps can be taken through economic 
sanctions to exert political pressure on that country. 
The main limitation to any economic sanction is that to 
be effective, it almost always requires the cooperation 
of other countries. Furthermore, terrorist groups which 
have their own means of support and do not rely on a
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particular state for financial assistance, arms or 
safe-haven, would not be an appropriate target of 
economic sanctions.
Wooten describes six broad categories of options 
against a terrorist-supporting state: restrictions on
foreign trade and exchange, technology transfer, foreign 
aid, export controls, capital transactions and economic 
access.^ Some of these options can be undertaken by 
the U.S. on a unilateral basis, while others require 
multilateral participation. Any sanction, however, must 
be undertaken with both long-term and immediate goals in 
mind. Wooten cautions that it is imperative to obtain a 
strong domestic consensus in favor of any economic 
sanction where the U.S. will bear some of the economic 
costs.
Flores describes several political events which 
have hampered multilateral participation in economic 
sanctions against states. For example, the oil embargo 
imposed subsequent to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war placed 
oil-dependent allies in an untenable position with 
Mideast oil producing countries. They could not 
"afford" the costs of any diplomatic or economic 
sanctions that may have impeded the flow of oil into 
their countries. Following the oil embargo and the 
resultant rise in the price of oil, Flores notes that 
some Arab leaders were left with vast financial
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resources. Leaders like Qaddafi of Libya were able to 
increase their funding of terrorist operations at a time 
when economic sanctions were least likely to be 
effective.^
Thus, Flores states, early U.S. economic policy
with regard to terrorism had three distinct
characteristics:
First, U.S. policies were increasingly 
unilateral in nature... Second, the U.S. efforts 
to combat terrorism became more symbolic, 
and less coercive, in intent...U.S. actions such 
as aid cut-off and trade restrictions appeared 
to be mere punishments for countries that had 
displeased the United States, or gestures 
symbolizing the United States' lonely opposition 
to terrorism. Finally... Congress rather 
than the Executive took the lead in attacking the 
terrorist menace.4
Unilateral Options
When forced to respond to terrorism without 
support from allies, the U.S. has several options: 
trade embargoes, embargoes on financial transactions, 
suspension of foreign assistance, restrictions on ship 
or air traffic or abrogation of treaties. The 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act gives the 
President broad discretion in economic foreign relations 
when a national emergency has been declared. While the 
President is limited to sanctions which deal directly 
with the specific threat to U.S. interests, he can
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regulate trade and any type of financial transaction 
between the U.S. and the country in question.6
The scope of this law is broad and subject to 
emergency situations only. Nevertheless, it has been 
imposed by the U.S. in the past. Since May 1985, trade 
and economic transactions with Nicaragua have been 
virtually halted. Iranian property and economic 
transactions were blocked by the U.S. between November 
1979 and April 1980, but were lifted in January 1981.
And a trade embargo with Libya in 1986 was also 
justified under this law. These long-term devices 
designed to persuade governments to alter their 
undesirable activities have had a limited effect.6 
Nicaragua and Libya do not rely on the U.S. as sole 
trading partners and the sanctions imposed represent 
little more than gestures on the part of the U.S.
Another U.S. initiative to resolve state-supported 
terrorism is the June 1976 Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. It provides for termination of 
assistance to any government which, ". . .aids or abets by 
granting sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or
group which has committed an act of international
7 . .terrorism."' This law provides for more specific
actions against states, such as the denial of assistance
funds, food aid and economic or military aid. Flores,
however, identifies two problems with this type of
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"diplomatic coercion." First, he feels that most states 
which support terrorism are not likely to also receive 
U.S. financial aid. Therefore, the U.S. would have no 
leverage with these states. Furthermore, he feels that 
if the U.S. did provide some type of aid to a country 
which was then discontinued, the population who may be 
affected by the lack of support might rebel. The 
resultant rising of national passions and anger directed 
against the U.S. could actually cause increased attacks 
on Americans— the opposite effect intended.
Fear of communism and the traditional view that 
U.S. technology and products are superior to those of 
other countries prompted controls on exports following 
World War II. Flores states that from 1949 to 1969, 
Americans believed that communism was the dominant 
threat to national security. As such, the government 
placed controls on exports to the USSR and other 
communist bloc countries of goods which could increase 
their military capabilities. Pressure from the business 
community to alter this policy came at a time when the 
U.S. administration also saw advantages to U.S. and 
Soviet trade. World events, such as the Munich massacre 
of Israeli athletes, caused the American public to 
re-evaluate the focus of threats to national security. 
Terrorism was clearly seen as a threat to U.S. 
interests.® Thus, the Export Administrations Act (EAA)
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and subsequent amendments in 1979 attempted to use the 
transfer of U.S. products not only to limit the power of 
other countries, but also as a foreign policy tool to 
manipulate states' activities in the arena of terrorist 
support.
The EAA of 1979 provides that certain products and 
technology should be denied export when U.S. foreign 
policy is clearly and demonstrably threatened. The 
Department of Commerce was assigned the task of 
maintaining a list of goods and technolgies which, 
because of their potential for furthering the military 
capability of a country, should be controlled by 
licensing procedures before export to certain states.
The State Department was given responsibility for 
determining which states to consider as supportive of 
terrorism. In 1979, the first year the State Department 
compiled a list of states which support terrorism, they 
cited Libya, Syria, Iraq and the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
Case Study #5
Initial bureaucratic technicalities made the 
intent of EAA difficult to put into practice. In 1978, 
for example, the U.S. sold Syria four L-100 cargo 
aircraft. The next year, three Boeing 747 aircraft and 
two Boeing 727 aircraft were sold to Libya. One method
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of by-passing the export controls in the early days of 
the law was to use a third country as mediary. In 
January 1980, General Electric (GE) applied for a 
license to sell engine cores to Italy, ultimately to be 
used in frigates being built for Iraq. GE made their 
request through all proper channels. The request, 
however, was not reviewed by the State Department 
because engine cores were not on the control list and 
Italy was not on the terrorist-support list. In April 
1980, members of the Iraqi-supported Arab Liberation 
Front attacked an Israeli kibbutz, bringing increased 
pressure on the Administration to stop the already 
approved sale of engine cores to Iraq. In May 1980, 
changes to the EAA insured that exports to the end user 
of goods would be controlled. This modification 
prevented a $208 million sale of commercial jets to
qIraq.
Flores contends, however, that the EAA has not 
reduced the incidence of terrorism. A major obstacle 
is the availability in the world market of the product 
in question. He says, for example, while Libya has not 
received U.S. jets for several years, it can simply 
purchase them through France. He also states that 
export controls without participation of other countries 
are basically unworkable. He complains that,
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The U.S. loses exports at a time when they 
are sorely needed. . .the reliability of U.S. 
business as exporters is reduced. . .and controls 
may gain only the enmity of the countries against 
which the controls are directed.10
Nevertheless, Wooten maintains that economic 
sanctions, while symbolic in nature when attempted 
unilaterally, are often the only reasonable recourse the 
U.S. has to maintain credibility in the fight against 
terrorism.11
Multilateral Initiatives
The U.S., while sometimes vainly attempting
unilateral economic sanctions against states which
support terrorism, has also attempted to solidify a
concerted response from western democracies. One
informal group which has had relative success in
mounting a united counterterrorist offensive is the
Summit Seven. Levitt describes this organization as
simply the leaders of the world's seven largest
industrialized democratic states— Canada, West Germany,
France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States. Levitt sees the Summit Seven as a potentially
effective organization because they yield, ". . .political
1 7and economic weight on the world scene. . . .,|X̂  He 
further contends that global organizations such as the 
United Nations are ineffective in the battle against
terrorism because they are too large and politically 
diverse and cannot agree on common measures.
The U.S. has spearheaded efforts to coordinate 
economic sanctions by Summit Seven countries and the 
European Economic Community against Libya and Syria.
Case Study #6
Prior to 1985, the U.S. repeatedly identified 
Libya as a key supporter of international terrorism. 
Coordinated terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna 
airports in December 1985, prompted the U.S. to 
take decisive action against Libya. President Reagan 
charged Libyan leader Qaddafi with providing,
". . .material support to terrorist groups which attack
i •aU.S. citizens. . . As a result, a slate of economic
sanctions was enacted by the U.S. against Libya. The 
unilateral sanctions included:
- Prohibition on purchases and imports from Libya;
- Restriction of exports to Libya;
- Ban on U.S.-Libyan maritime and aviation relations;
- Ban on trade in services relating to Libyan projects
- Ban on credits, loans, or the transfer of 
anything of value to Libya or its nationals;
- Prohibition on transactions relating to travel 
by Americans to Libya;
- Blocking of all official Libyan assets in
the U.S. or in overseas branches of U.S. banks.
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While the U.S. implored the western democracies to 
join in on the economic boycott of Libya, relatively 
little was done by Summit Seven countries to 
comply with the U.S. request. An agreement was 
reached by the other six countries to refrain from 
undercutting the U.S. sanctions and to limit any 
commercial benefit possible from the void left by the 
U.S. They also resolved to stop any export of arms or 
other military equipment to Libya. A lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of the Europeans was due in part, according 
to Levitt, to the threat of reprisals that Italy, Spain 
and Greece felt likely because of their close proximity 
to Libya.
In June 1986, after U.S. military action was taken 
against Libya, all U.S. companies were prohibited from 
operating in Libya. Furthermore, exports of U.S. 
components and parts, destined for Libya were 
restricted. Subsequent cooperation with European allies 
helped the U.S. ban imports of petroleum products into 
the United States, which were refined in third countries 
from Libyan crude oil. Levitt states that these 
measures have had a positive effect. He notes that,
"The U.S. economic sanctions and the limited cooperation 
given to them by the Europeans, combined with the 
overall drop in world oil prices, have definitely
1 Kaffected the Libyan economy."
Case Study #7
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The 1988 U.S. State Department report reveals a
possible new trend in Syrian-sponsored terrorism. It
was noted that
We did not detect direct Syrian involvement in 
any international terrorist incidents. Indeed, 
the diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on 
Syria by the U.S. and European Community in 
November, 1986 seemed to have had a salutory 
effect on Syria.
Prior to this latest finding on Syria, however, 
the U.S. government had identified Syria as being both 
actively involved in terrorism and as a harbor for a 
number of terrorist groups with like objectives.
Premier among the groups that the State Department 
linked to Syria was the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO).
The U.S. government charges the ANO with more than 90 
terrorist attacks in 20 countries since 1974, killing or 
injuring nearly 900 people.
Taking the lead in imposing sanctions on Syria was 
the United Kingdom. The April 1986 discovery of a bomb 
in the luggage of an unsuspecting Irish woman in 
London's Heathrow airport, bound for Tel Aviv, led to 
questions of Syrian involvement. The British 
investigation proved Syrian backing of the bomb attempt. 
The Jordanian boyfriend of the woman found with the 
bomb, Nizar Hindawi, was convicted in a British court of
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the crime. British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe
detailed Hindawi's complicity with Syria to the House
of Commons:
Hindawi had entered Britain on an official 
Syrian passport under a false name; the Syrian 
ambassador had been personally involved in 
communications between Hindawi and Syrian 
intelligence services several months before the 
attempt; Hindawi had met with the Syrian 
ambassador after the discovery of the bomb; he 
had spent the night after the bombing attempt in 
a Syrian embassy safe house; and during his 
detention he had attempted to contact Syrian 
intelligence officials in Damascus to seek 
their help in securing his release.
With the overwhelming evidence against Syria in
hand, Britain undertook several sanctions: diplomatic
relations between the UK and Syria were severed and
security was tightened on incoming Syrian flights. The
U.S. immediately withdrew its ambassador from Syria in
support of the British. France and West Germany,
however, took no immediate action. France at that time,
according to Levitt had two strong reasons for remaining
silent. First, they were negotiating a $300 million
contract to sell arms to Syria and also they had eight
hostages in Lebanon, held by Syrian-backed groups.
Eventually, however, France and the other members of the
European Economic Community agreed to a halt in arms
sales to Syria, suspension of visits to their countries
by ranking Syrian officials and closer surveillance of
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Syrian diplomatic buildings and airline flights. The
U.S. and Japan also levied sanctions against Syria.
Subsequent to the concerted actions of the
European Community, the U.S. and Japan, Levitt describes
an apparent change in the Syrian posture. He states,
. . .as soon as a decent interval had passed 
without the occurrence of further blatant 
Syrian-supported terrorism and certain signs 
of an improved attitude had appeared, notably 
the closure of some terrorists' offices in 
Damascus, Western countries began to 
relax their stand. 19
The United States returned its ambassador to Syria
after the closure of the ANO office in September 1986.
Summary
Many factors exist that make desirable the 
imposition of economic sanctions against states that 
support terrorism. Generally, economic policy, when 
undertaken in conjunction with foreign allies, can serve 
to unite nations in the fight against terrorism. 
Sanctions also have high potential for popular domestic 
support because they involve the least direct danger to 
U.S. lives and property. Care is usually taken, 
however, to ensure that U.S. corporations do not suffer 
unintended consequences because of the sanction.
Superimposed on all other practical considerations 
of sanctions are the realities of primary foci of
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international relations. After determination of a 
particular state's economic vulnerability to U.S. and 
allied sanctions/ each contemplated course of action is 
typically— and wisely— weighed against competing 
objectives. Senior policy-makers are continually faced 
with potential consequences which may pose more severe 
problems than those which originally prompted a course 
of action. One wonders/ for example if it is better to 
overlook minor Soviet sponsorship of terrorism/ than to 
risk loss of diplomatic relations? When ties were 
temporarily broken with Syria, Levitt reports that the 
U.S. suffered a grave loss in intelligence collection 
capability. Therefore, foreign policy objectives 
must be clearly articulated by decision-makers before 
risking an inappropriate counterterrorist response.
Finally, while there seems to be general 
consensus that unilateral economic sanctions have 
limited utility, there may be circumstances when such 
action is the only available option. The U.S. has to be 
cognizant of the "appearance" of supporting terrorism by 
continuing to do business with states that sponsor 
terrorism.
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Chapter VII 
Use of Force
With few exceptions, the U.S. policy to counter 
terrorism has involved non-violent pressure tactics, 
designed to persuade a country harboring or supporting 
terrorists to cease and desist. The missing ingredient 
in this response is a clear message to terrorists that 
they will pay a heavy cost for mounting operations 
against American personnel or property. One way to 
deter terrorists from committing acts of violence is to 
let them know in advance that the cost of their activity 
will be high and then ensure that the promise is kept.
Developing a strategy that includes offensive 
action requires planning which is selective and 
procedures which are flexible. Wardlaw believes that a 
policy is necessary which allows for finite 
discrimination between terrorists and responses. He 
contends, that while terrorism is a menace to an ordered 
society, a greater danger lies in allowing the fear of 
terrorist activity to force policy changes by states.
He says, ". . .states must be committed to the policy 
which is the real target of a terrorist attack if they 
are to provide any true deterrent to future
international terrorism."1 In October 1983 when 241 
U.S. Marines in Lebanon were killed after a truck packed 
with explosives crashed through the guardposts, the 
foreign policy of the Islamic Jihad was made clear. The 
U.S. policy, however, was less than consistent as within 
four months the Marines had evacuated Beirut. Wardlaw 
sees the withdrawal as having the appearance of 
vacillation and weakness— the wrong message to send to 
potential terrorists. While the terrorist attack 
precipitated the withdraw of U.S. forces from Lebanon, 
the underlying issues of appropriateness of the 
commitment, domestic dissent and the Marine mission
# Oweighed heavily on the ultimate decision. Although 
hindsight is inherently more vivid, the Lebanon 
experience did project an image of the U.S. succumbing 
to terrorism. There has been an increase in terrorist 
activity targeting U.S. personnel since that time, but 
there is no way to prove that a perceived lack of 
military resolve is the root cause.
Conceptual Considerations
A dichotomy in U.S. foreign policy with regard to 
the use of military force has existed, according to 
Shultz since the end of World War II. He suggests that 
while the U.S. recognizes the need to use military force 
in defense of national interests, there also exists a
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moral desire to find alternate means to settle
differences. Thus, military power eventually evolved as
a force not to engage in war, but to prevent it. Shultz
calls this the "peaceful application of military force"
and, as such, sees great potential in a deterrence 
•astrategy.J
Nevertheless, the efficacy of a non-use military 
strategy is questionable. In terms of a nuclear war or 
a post-World War II conflict in Western Europe, it has 
fared well. Unfortunately, deterrence did not work in 
Vietnam or Korea. The legacy of Vietnam, according to 
Shultz has led some public policy makers and 
academicians to conclude that the changing nature of 
world politics has caused military power to lose its 
utility.
The onslaught of terrorist attacks, paralyzing 
world attention with a fear of uncontrolled violence, 
has caused a public outcry for use of force or military 
retaliation against the criminals. The act of "striking 
back" has much to offer on a psychological level.
Wardlaw cites the Israeli model of counterterrorism as 
one which demonstrates to the population under siege 
that they are not merely helpless targets.'4 The old 
testament adage of "An eye for an eye..." has also 
gained popularity with Americans who feel that the U.S. 
is indiscriminately targeted by terrorists. However,
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use of force against terrorists has required a 
realignment of priorities within military and 
paramilitary organizations.
Military force can be applied within an overall 
counterterrorist strategy in the form of retaliation or 
intervention. The U.S. can use retaliation to "punish" 
the perpetrators of terrorist acts, after an incident. 
This retaliatory action is intended to send a message to 
terrorists that they will "pay" for their action.
Israeli counterterrorist strategy has become one of 
"retaliation" or "reprisals" for terrorist attacks. 
O'Brien states, "The need to reassure the Israeli public 
that terrorism would not go unpunished frequently 
resulted in a pattern of terrorist incidents followed by
Cretaliatory counterterror s t r i k e s . T h e  Israelis 
believed that this type of activity would provide the 
best deterrence against future terrorism. Wardlaw 
points out that there are serious doubts as to the 
effectiveness of the Israeli retaliatory policy.
Further, he cautions, when the U.S. contemplates 
embracing such a policy, the moral and political cost
could weigh heavily. He writes that,
We must avoid letting a thirst for vengence 
be quenched by turning to tactics which 
caused terror themselves, unless we can be 
sure that they are precisely targeted on the 
offenders and unless we can be sure (or as sure 
as humanly possible) that the act will have a 
deterrent effect and will not serve only to 
provoke future terrorism.
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Organizing an aggressive response against 
unconventional adversaries like terrorists will require 
a restructuring of military power to address the threat. 
The first step, however, in a planned strategy which 
includes possible retaliation or preemptive strikes is 
the political will to carry them out. The ongoing 
debate among policymakers as to the advisability of 
retaliatory or preemptive action merely adds to the 
indecision manifested in U.S. policy. President 
Reagan's closest advisors reportedly disagreed on the 
application of military force when countering terrorism. 
For example, Wooten stated that, according to press 
reports, Secretary of State Shultz advocated strong 
retaliation against terrorists and any country that 
supported them. Defense Secretary Weinberger, on the 
other hand, urged restraint. The "Weinberger Doctrine" 
has been described by Dr. Edward Luttwok of the Center 
for Strategic Studies as a policy that rationalizes a 
bureaucratic self-serving attitude.
Weinberger addressed the use of military power in 
a November 24, 1984 speech on "The Use of Military 
Power." He examined the circumstances under which the 
decision to use force should be made. He concluded that 
six major tests should be applied prior to a decision: 
(1) The issue should be deemed vital to the U.S. 
national interest; (2) military forces should be
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committed wholeheartedly, if deemed necessary; (3) the 
decision to commit forces should be based on clearly 
defined political and military goals; (4) the size, 
composition and disposition of military forces should be 
flexible and appropriate, based on the mission; (5) 
there should be reasonable support from the American 
people and political representatives; and (6) 
commitment of forces should be a step of last resort.
In mounting an action response against terrorism, 
the U.S. has three basic types of forces available: 
conventional military and paramilitary forces, special 
overt and covert forces, and surrogate forces.
Surrogate Forces
Surrogate forces have been used by the U.S. on a 
limited basis. While these efforts tend to be highly 
guarded secrets of the administration, sources in 
Washington reported to Newsweek that the Lebanese 
government wanted a U.S. trained "hit team" to punish 
terrorists or preempt them. The CIA trained Lebanese 
counter-terrorist unit was allegedly responsible for the 
killing of approximately 80 persons on March 8, 1986, 
when a car bomb was detonated in Beirut. The target of 
the attack reportedly was fundamentalist Muslim leader, 
Sheik Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, whom American
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intelligence specialists believed was involved in the 
attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in 1984.7
The Lebanese surrogates, it seems, had their own 
agenda, separate from U.S. concerns. The obvious 
problems of lack of control, questionable reliability, 
unpredictability and differences in priority appear to 
diminish the feasibility of using surrogate forces 
except in the most narrowly defined situations.
Conventional Forces
Conventional military forces may be used in a 
variety of postures in order to thwart terrorism. They 
can assist in a "surgical" air strike against terrorist 
installations, a selective air attack against terrorist 
targets in a sponsoring country, large-scale naval and 
air strikes against sponsoring countries and naval 
blockades. Conventional forces use would necessitate 
public awareness of the activity— at least after the 
fact. Examples of the use of conventional forces to aid 
in counterterrorism efforts are rare. The U.S. raid on 
Libya qualifies as a retaliatory action taken by 
President Reagan after other efforts to deter Qaddafi 
had failed.
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Case Study #8
The Reagan administration began in 1981 to send a 
message to Libyan terrorists that violent activity would 
not be tolerated. In May 1981, the Libyan diplomatic 
mission in Washington, D.C. was closed. Later that 
year, Libyan fighter aircraft fired on two U.S. Navy 
fighters. The result was the downing of the Libyan 
planes. In 1982, economic sanctions such as an embargo 
on Libyan oil and curtailment on the transfer of 
technology to Libya, failed to temper Qaddafi's 
enthusiasm for supporting terrorism. Lack of 
cooperation on the part of European allies allowed the 
Colonel to circumvent U.S. restrictions. Qaddafi turned 
to arms brokers and dealers in Europe to gain spare 
parts for U.S. made military hardware. According to 
Shultz, economic sanctions could have succeeded in Libya 
with international cooperation. He says that Libya's 
income is based solely on the export of oil— estimated 
at $5 billion in revenue in 1986. Libya also relies, 
however, on the import of approximately $4 billion of 
food and other necessities to meet the needs of the 
population. If the oil revenue had dropped 
significantly, shortages in the country could have 
pressured Qaddafi to modify his stance on terrorism.
Before military force was finally applied in 
Libya, Shultz reports that the Administration was 
careful to ensure that they could positively answer the 
following questions: Did the U.S. have irrefutable
evidence to prove involvement by Libya? Could targets 
be identified that were linked to the terrorist 
activity? Was it possible to isolate these targets to 
minimize civilian damage? Would the American public 
support actions? And would Western European allies back 
the U.S.? Shultz feels that the airstrike was the choice 
of last resort for the U.S. considering the escalating 
terrorist activity sponsored by Libya and directed at 
U.S. officials. He said, ". . .the administration sent a 
signal that there is a point at which terrorism will no
Olonger be tolerated. This was long overdue."0
The effectiveness of the 1986 Libyan raid is often 
debated. One day after the strike on Libya, 97 western 
terrorism experts, meeting at a seminar in Scotland, 
agreed that the U.S. had made an error in its 
retaliation. The prevailing view was that the strike 
would propel Qaddafi to back increased acts of 
terrorism. Bremer, U.S. ambassador-at-large for 
counterterrorism, disagrees. He cites as many as 35 
attacks planned by Libya that were averted within weeks 
of the attack. He further states,
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. .military actions have nonmilitary 
consequences far removed from the scene. . . 
the message of U.S. resolve was unequivocal 
. . .Overall, there was a dramatic drop in 
Middle East-sponsored terrorism in Europe 
following our Libya attack and the accompanying 
diplomatic and political measures. . . ."
It is difficult to judge the real effects of the 
Libya raid on the problem of terrorism. However, the 
deterrent value of the U.S. finally backing up 
political rhetoric and impotence with action should not 
be readily discounted.
Case Study #9
Overt conventional attacks have only a small place 
in the overall fight against terrorism. After the U.S. 
Embassy annex in Beirut was destroyed by a suicide car 
bomb in September 1984, talk of retaliation was 
addressed by the State Department. According to Motley, 
one official commented, "There is no sense talking about 
retaliation unless you know who is to be retaliated 
against."*® The umbrella Islamic organization known 
as Hizbollah was believed responsible for the attack.
The White House was told, however, that group leaders 
and followers do not assemble in one place and any raid 
would likely involve high civilian casualties. The key 
questions Weinberger and the Administration asked prior 
to the Libya raid were not able to be answered in 
Beirut. The bottom line, however, rests with the
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question, "What is to be gained, and at what price?" 
Costs of possible U.S. casualties, innocent civilian 
casualties, illegal use of force, possible military 
escalation and failure have to be weighed against the 
immediate and long-term deterrent effects of the deed.
Special Military Forces
Another application of the use of military force 
to counter terrorism is the use of forces to "intervene" 
during terrorist operations. One characteristic of 
terrorist groups is that they tend to operate in small, 
highly trained cells. The obvious advantage is that it 
gives the group flexibility and mobility while 
preserving their chances of surprise and survival. 
Likewise, President Kennedy saw the need for military 
units, specially trained and equipped to deal with the 
changing nature of warfare. According to Emerson, he 
called for ". . .a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly 
different kind of force; and, therefore, a new and 
wholly different kind of military training.
Although Kennedy's Green Berets were heavily active in 
Vietnam, they caused widespread resentment among the 
"conventional" forces there. Emerson states that the 
schism which developed between the special and 
conventional forces was reflected later in the reduced
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budget for the unconventional forces in the post-Vietnam 
era. Terrorism played an important role in forcing a 
change in the priorities of military commanders.
Specialized counterterrorism units became popular 
in the 1970's— just as the incidence of terrorism 
increased. France organized "Groupement de Intervention 
Gendarmerie National" (GIGN), Israel, the "General 
Headquarters Unit" (GHQ), West Germany,
"Grenzschutzgruppe 9" (GSG-9) and the United States, the
"Delta Force." U.S. personnel are chosen from the
Army's Ranger forces, the Navy's SEALs and the Air
Force's Special Operations Command. These highly trained
members excel in marksmanship skills, athletic abilities
that stress endurance and agility, intelligence
capabilities, psychological stability, discipline,
willingness to function as a team and patience. These
special forces are prepared to deploy the instant the
order is given, allowing decision-makers the option of
1 ?rescue operations or small commando attacks. ^
Unfortunately, the U.S. record of success in 
special operations designed to intervene during a 
terrorist situation is not very admirable. In 1980 in 
Iran, the ill-fated hostage rescue attempt caused 
skeptics to doubt the ability of U.S. forces to do the 
job at all.
Case Study #10
In 1985, TWA Flight 847 was hijacked while
enroute from Athens to Rome and the special forces again
had the opportunity to respond. As the two Moslem
hijackers headed the plane toward Beirut, crisis
centers in Washington, D.C. were set up to determine
what action, if any, to take. The flight initially
landed at Beirut, refuelled, and released 19 passengers
as a "goodwill" gesture. At the same time, however, two
additional Lebanese terrorists entered the plane. The
plane next landed at Algiers, where terrorist demands
were reinforced by the murder of U.S. Navy diver
Stethem. Once Washington decided to activate the
special counterterrorist teams, requests were sent to
several governments for permission to deploy the
commandos. Emerson reports that Britain, Malta, Italy
and Israel responded favorably, while Egypt and Algeria
declined to allow U.S. forces to operate from their
soil. The commandos were prepared to act several times
1 *3but diplomatic constraints prevented it. J Eventually 
the hostages were dispersed within Beirut and the U.S. 
missed any opportunity for rescue.
The French counterterrorist unit, GIGN, has had 
success in rescue operations. In February 1976, they 
rescued a busload of school children hijacked by
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terrorists. And the Israeli success at Entebbe is 
legendary as a classic example of a quick-reacting 
hostage rescue.
The U.S. constraints of geographic distance/ 
non-cooperation from foreign governments and 
bureaucratic indecision by policymakers, are tough 
obstacles to overcome. Nevertheless, the U.S. should 
strive to solve these problems in order to maintain a 
capability to respond to an on-going terrorist crisis. 
Although the main tenet of the U.S. policy regarding 
terrorism is that of no concessions; the lines of 
communication should be kept open. And, as with the 
tests for the use of force in conventional military 
intervention, offensive action can play a vital role if 
appropriate and used as a last resort. If the terrorist 
feels intervention of a hostage-taking incident may 
occur, leaders who direct activity may be deterred.
Covert Operations
A possible alternative to the public and 
bureaucratic constraints placed on the use of overt 
operations is the use of secret operatives to carry out 
actions against terrorists. The Central Intelligence 
Agency, under the direction of the President, is the 
only agency legally authorized to carry out "special 
activities" or covert operations. The National Security
Council (NSC) established the Office of Special Projects 
(OSP) in 1948, which according to Celmer, was directed 
to "plan and conduct covert operations.14 The OSP has 
evolved into the present Directorate of Operations, 
which represents the intelligence community's main asset 
in combatting international terrorism. The details 
surrounding the CIA's involvement in counterterrorism 
remain classified and, as such, difficult to assess. 
Nevertheless, Robert Oakley, former U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, cited improved
intelligence collection as helping to deter more than
1 R180 terrorist actions during a period of 18 months.
The advantage of using covert resources to 
implement foreign policy objectives is that it gives the 
administration wide leverage in dealing with foreign 
persons and governments without the fear of reprisals 
from world opinion. Covert operations entail such 
activities as collecting intelligence information, 
protecting against espionage and using various means to 
affect international and political events in a certain 
country that are favorable to U.S. interests. Covert 
military operations launched during the Reagan 
administration were a violation of U.S. law and helped 
point out flaws in the system of checks and balances.
In order to use CIA activities as a deterrent to future 
terrorist threats, the terrorists must be aware of the
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possible sanctions. The nature of intelligence 
operations performed by the CIA requires them to 
maintain secrecy. Therefore, covert operations designed 
to use force against terrorists may not be consistent 
with our laws and moral obligations. Brian Jenkins 
argues that,
...while covert operations may be necessary under 
extraordinary circumstances, if we are obliged to 
use force in response to terrorism we ought to do 
so with the legitimately constituted armed forces 
of this country— openly, and with an unambiguous 
message as to who is responsible and why we are 
doing it. 6
Summary
In a democratic society that strives to uphold the 
"letter of the law," counterterrorist options that 
include use of force require thorough examination.
While retribution is often the psychologically most 
appealing response to a violent attack, it also requires 
the greatest amount of restraint in its use. The 
question of appropriateness as well as national security 
considerations needs to be balanced against public 
opinion and the deterrence value of the action. 
Conventional forces are a strong tool of foreign policy, 
but of limited utility in a fight against smaller, more 
mobile forces. Specially trained military forces offer 
a better alternative when mounting rescue operations and 
selected commando attacks against terrorist targets.
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Surrogate forces and covert operations, while 
appropriate in the most narrow circumstances, generally 
are difficult to control and violate the essence of a 
deterrence philosophy. If the U.S. decides a terrorist 
situation is best resolved with the use of force, the 
government should be willing to acknowledge that action 
as a legitimate right within the bounds of legal and 
moral constraints.
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Chapter VIII 
Counterterrorism Model
The body of literature on the subject of terrorism 
contains numerous models designed to guide analysis of 
events, assessments of existing threats and proposals of 
response for the edification of policymakers. Most 
conceptual models have some utility; all have 
limitations.
In their heuristic model constructed on rule-based 
computer systems, Waterman and Jenkins designate three 
primary focal points of terrorist activities: events,
groups and contexts.1 Events are defined as 
individual terrorist incidents; groups referred to 
identifiable and distinct organizations which employ 
terrorist tactics. "Context" is envisioned as including 
local political structures, economic aspects, the 
relative efficacy of law enforcement and security forces 
and all other social, governmental and logistical 
factors which impact on terrorist situations. As a 
heuristic device, their model facilitates the analysis 
of events by methodically diagramming known information 
and thereby highlighting what needs to be known.
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The authors describe wheels as analogies for their 
important focal points. The event wheel, for example, 
contains spokes with such information categories as 
date, time, group claiming responsibility, target, type 
of attack and location. Similar focus "wheels" are used 
to guide analysts in the development of information 
concerning groups and contexts.^
Most models developed for the analysis of 
terrorism-related phenomena define variables in terms of 
categories, hierarchies and spectra.
A typical two-dimensional analytical framework for 
counterterrorism operations is set forth by Stephen
OSloan of the Airpower Research Institute. The 
framework (see Figure 1) is intended to facilitate force 
selection and targets in terrorism preemption 
operations.
In their report on state-sponsored terrorism, 
prepared in 1985 for the U.S. Senate, Cline and 
Alexander conceive of the "spectrum of conflict" as a 
continuum ranging from "normal economic and diplomatic 
pressure" to "overt hostilities (warfare)" with 
intermediate levels of "destabilization," "subversion," 
"armed insurgency" and "guerrilla operations."4 The 
intermediate levels collectively are termed
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"low-intensity conflict." Cline and Alexander note that
the "elements" of low-intensity conflict often create
conditions leading to state-sponsored terrorism.5
Both of the above-designed models, while
functional, illustrate the tendency to address in
isolation the various bodies of information needed to
assess available countermeasures.
As Alon points out in his examination of Israeli
countermeasures against Palestinian terrorism, two
distinct levels of analysis are appropriate:
An "Extra-terror" perspective treats terrorism 
as one of many casualty-producing phenomena, 
ranked with drunk-driving and industrial safety.
An "Intra-terror" view is totally within "the 
domain of terrorism" judging the applicability 
of "individual countermeasures vis-a-vis 
policy objectives."6
Similarly, there exists an apparent tendency to 
consider certain countermeasures as inherently more 
intrusive and risky than others. But the circumstances 
and context of many terrorist situations would indicate 
otherwise. For example, a covert operation, usually 
considered to carry high risk and involve complex 
planning, may constitute a more straightforward 
countermeasure than an economic situation. The tendency 
to consider countermeasures as hierarchical also creates 
a "try and see" mentality in which escalating 
initiatives are predictable and time-consuming.
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Perhaps a more realistic analytical model is one 
which simultaneously considers the implementation and 
probable effects of all possible countermeasures within 
changing contexts. An additional important feature of 
such a model would be an interactive dimension, i.e., 
the on-going assessment of how various countermeasures 
affect the potentialities of others. Finally, the 
model, above all, must be capable of dynamic information 
assimilation. Rapidly changing international relations 
is an essential analytical dimension given today's 
complex web of transnational economic arrangements. 
Leaders of a closely allied nation which share our 
definition of a terrorist situation can easily become 
recalcitrant when government economists explain the 
implications of even extending moral support.
Application
The essential thrust of a dynamic model is to 
reduce subjectivity at the analytical level and shift 
value judgements to the decision-making level. The 
Waterman-Jenkins heuristic model serves this purpose 
insofar as analysis is guided by pre-established 
frameworks. But the linkages between the essentially 
static "event" and "group" focal points and dynamic 
"context" variables are provided by analysts who cannot
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help but be influenced by domain assumptions and 
preconceived notions.
The dynamic model presented herein focuses 
primarily on countermeasure packaging. The model (see 
Figure 2) is a three-dimensional conceptualization of 
the process that decision-makers should follow before 
assigning an appropriate countermeasure. The three 
areas that should be considered include: 
countermeasures, group (terrorist) and the context that 
the countermeasure is within. This model provides a 
starting point for analysts to evaluate and compare the 
consequences of actions with the affects the action will 
have on the terrorist group. Thus, policymakers are 
provided with a range of countermeasures that can be 
applied in most situations and that are not static or 
hierarchical.
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